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LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING AHEAD AS THE HOME MORTGAGE 
DISCLOSURE ACT TURNS THIRTY-FIVE: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC 
DISCLOSURE OF LENDING DATA IN A TIME OF FINANCIAL CRISIS 
RICHARD D. MARSICO* 
L Introduction 
Congress passed the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
("HMDA") 1 in 1975 as a tool to end redlining. Redlining is a broad 
term that covers many different practices. In the context of the 
passage of HMDA, redlining is a lender's refusal to lend, or lending 
on more onerous terms, in urban, older, low-income or predominant-
ly minority neighborhoods, not based on an individualized analysis 
of the loan applicant's eligibility for the loan, but on the 
characteristics of the neighborhood. Unlike other statutes like the 
Fair Housing Act ("FHA")2 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
("ECOA"),3 which target discriminatory behavior, HMDA does not 
prohibit redlining, create remedies to eliminate it or penalize lenders 
who practice it. Instead, HMDA relies on the power of public 
disclosure of lending data to stop lenders from redlining by embar-
rassing them if they make few or no loans in redlined neighborhoods. 
As HMDA turns thirty-five years old, there are four 
interrelated themes in its history that suggest a role for HMDA in this 
era of financial crisis. First, HMDA's mission has expanded signifi-
cantly from an anti-redlining statute to include anti-discrimination 
and anti- reverse redlining. In 1989, Congress expanded HMDA's 
mission to add detecting and eliminating race discrimination in home 
mortgage lending to HMDA's original anti-redlining purpose. In 
2002, HMDA came full circle. This time, the problem was reverse 
redlining-too many high-priced subprime loans in predominantly 
minority neighborhoods. The Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (the "Fed")-the agency responsible for enforcing 
HMDA-responded by issuing regulations that expanded HMDA's 
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I wish to thank the School for 
its generous support of this research. 
1 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10 
(2006). 
2 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2006). 
3 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-169lf(2006). 
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mission to include detecting and preventing reverse redlining by 
requiring lenders to disclose information about the location of their 
subprime loans. 
Second, to help accomplish HMDA's expanding mission, 
both Congress and the Fed increased both the number of lenders that 
HMDA covers and the amount of information they are required to 
disclose. Originally, HMDA covered only banks and their majority-
owned home mortgage lenders. Now, HMDA covers nearly all home 
mortgage lenders, whether or not they are owned by banks. 
Originally, HMDA required covered lenders to disclose only the 
location of their home mortgage loans. Now, HMDA requires lenders 
to disclose the geographic source of their home mortgage loan 
applications, the race of applicants and borrowers, their decisions on 
applications and the interest rate on subprime loans. 
Third, even though Congress and the Fed expanded 
HMDA's mission and increased the amount of data that lenders are 
required to disclose to accomplish this mission, they have generally 
stopped short of requiring lenders to disclose enough information to 
establish (or not establish) redlining, lending discrimination or 
reverse redlining. In its original form, HMDA did not require lenders 
to disclose the number of loan applications they received, which 
made it difficult to determine whether the absence of lending in 
allegedly redlined neighborhoods was due to redlining or lack of 
demand for loans. Congressional amendments to HMDA in 1989 
required lenders to disclose the number and geographical source of 
applications they received, the race of loan applicants and their 
decisions on the applications-thus addressing the issue of demand 
for loans. But these amendments did not require lenders to disclose 
information about the creditworthiness of loan applicants, hampering 
efforts to determine whether higher rates of rejections of loan 
applications from minority borrowers than whites were due to 
relatively weaker creditworthiness or race. In 2002, when the Fed 
required lenders to disclose the interest rate on subprime loans, it did 
not require them to disclose the credit score of the borrower. 
Borrower credit scores would have made it possible to determine 
whether the higher interest rate was justified by the borrower's risk 
level or attributable to other factors. 
Fourth, HMDA data have shown evidence (although not 
proof) that lenders are redlining, discriminating and engaging in 
reverse redlining. After HMDA's passage in 1975, the data showed a 
lack of lending in allegedly redlined neighborhoods. Following the 
1989 amendments, the data showed disproportionately high rejection 
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rates of loan applications from African-Americans, Latinos and 
residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods. With the 2002 
amendments, the data showed disproportionately high subprime 
lending to African-Americans, Latinos and residents of predominant-
ly minority neighborhoods. Despite this evidence, the impact of these 
disclosures has been mixed, in large part because the Fed and other 
agencies that regulate lenders questioned the weight of the evidence 
due to the limitations in HMDA data. The only really significant 
impact took place after the 1989 amendments, when public outcry 
and the media coverage about the disparate rejection rates based on 
race was so strong that it forced Congress to take notice and the 
agencies to take action. This led to significant lending increases to 
African-Americans, Latinos and residents of predominantly minority 
neighborhoods. 
Looking ahead, perhaps the lesson to be learned from 
HMDA's history is that unless the data disclosures are, on their face, 
very compelling-in the form, for example, of highly differentiated 
rejection rates on home mortgage loan applications based on race-
and if the data do not contain sufficient information about the lending 
practice to be remedied, then the data disclosure will not be effective 
in eliminating the targeted practice. This lesson may be particularly 
apt now. The economic crisis-triggered at least in part by losses that 
lenders incurred as a result of defaults and foreclosures on risky and 
abusive home mortgage lending practices-has generated several 
proposals to strengthen regulation of the financial services industry. 
The most prominent of these is the proposed Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency Act of 2009 ("CFPAA").4 The CFPAA would 
expand HMDA's mission once again, this time to detect many of the 
lending practices that led to the financial crisis and to identify the 
lenders that engage in them. 5 HMDA's past seems to be playing itself 
out in this proposal. The amendments would require lenders to 
disclose information about risky and abusive home mortgage lending 
practices, including, for example, the difference between the annual 
percentage rate on a bank's loans and a benchmark rate for all banks, 
any interest rate adjustment period, and the terms of any pre-payment 
penalties.6 However, the CFPAA would not require lenders to 
disclose other information about risky and abusive lending practices, 
4 Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 11 lth 
Cong. (2009). 
5 Id. at § 188. 
6 Id. at§ 188(c)(l). 
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including, for example, whether the borrower can afford the loan 
when originated. Given the catastrophic consequences of unsafe 
lending and the potential power of public disclosure, Congress 
should take advantage of the current reform opportunity to give 
HMDA the tools to identify lending practices that are risky and 
abusive and the lenders who engage in these practices. 
Part II of this article reviews HMDA's early history, from its 
passage in 1975 to 1988. It reviews the legislative history ofHMDA, 
revealing Congress' intent to use public disclosure to eliminate 
redlining. Part II also documents the limited nature of HMDA's 
initial disclosures and the minimal impact the disclosures had. Part 
III covers the middle period ofHMDA's history, from 1989 to 2002. 
This period includes the expansion of HMDA's mission in 1989 into 
a tool to detect and prevent home mortgage lending discrimination 
and the corresponding increased data disclosure requirements. Part 
Ill also examines the role that the expanded data had in the increases 
in lending to African-Americans, Latinos and residents of 
predominantly minority neighborhoods that followed the 1989 
amendments. Part IV examines HMDA's expansion in 2002 into a 
tool to fight reverse redlining by requiring lenders to disclose the 
number and location of their subprime loans. The subsequent data 
disclosure showed significant disproportionate distribution of 
subprime loans in predominantly minority neighborhoods and to 
minority borrowers, but the disclosure of this data did not have the 
same impact as the disclosure of data after 1989. Part V discusses 
proposals to amend HMDA to expand its mission to include 
detecting risky and abusive home mortgage lending practices. While 
the proposals contained in the CFPAA are helpful, they do not 
require lenders to disclose sufficient information to detect the full 
range of lending practices that are responsible for high loan default 
and disclosure rates. HMDA's past shows that insufficient HMDA 
data disclosure requirements undermine HMDA's mission. Finally, 
Part VI provides concluding lessons from HMDA thus far. The 
enormity of the financial crisis and the role that risky and abusive 
home mortgage lending practices played in it suggest that Congress 
should learn from HMDA's past and make sure that any amendments 
to HMDA will result in disclosure of sufficient information to detect 
and prevent the fullest possible range of unsafe and abusive home 
mortgage lending practices. 
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IL The Initial Passage and Subsequent Expansion of HMDA: 
1975-1988 
Congress' intent in passing HMDA was to use the power of 
public disclosure to eliminate redlining in low-income, urban and 
predominantly minority neighborhoods. HMDA's initial provisions 
were limited, covering only banks and their majority-owned 
mortgage lenders and requiring them to disclose only the location of 
their home mortgage loans. Between 1980 and 1988, Congress and 
the Fed made statutory and regulatory changes to HMDA that 
improved public access to HMDA data and made the data more 
helpful in identifying redlining. These changes included aggregating 
HMDA data for all lenders in each metropolitan area, creating central 
HMDA depositories in each metropolitan area, requiring lenders to 
report the census tract of each loan and extending HMDA coverage 
to more lenders. HMDA data in this period frequently showed that 
banks made few loans in low-income or predominantly minority 
neighborhoods, but the Fed discounted this because of the data's 
limitations, particularly in failing to provide information about the 
demand for home mortgage loans. 
A. Congressional Intent in Passing HMDA 
Congress passed HMDA in 1975 in light of evidence that 
banks had "redlined" certain neighborhoods because of 
characteristics other than the creditworthiness of the residents.7 
Redlining is used in HMDA's legislative history as a term to describe 
several different practices, including failing or refusing to lend, 
lending at higher interest rates or more onerous loan terms or 
otherwise making it very difficult for a resident of a particular 
neighborhood to get a loan regardless of her creditworthiness 
because the neighborhood in which the loan would be made has 
characteristics the lender does not like.8 Senator William Proxmire 
stated that a lender "should not arbitrarily reject loan applications 
from sound credit risks on sound houses simply because he does not 
7 Congress found that "some depository institutions have sometimes 
contributed to the decline of certain geographic areas by their failure ... to 
provide adequate home financing to qualified applicants on reasonable 
terms and conditions." 12 U.S.C. § 280 I (a) (2006). 
8 See 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,160-61 (1975) (statement of Sen. 
Proxmire). 
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like the neighborhood, or because he fears it may at some future time 
decline."9 
The legislative history of HMDA refers most frequently to 
redlining in "older" and "urban" neighborhoods. 10 There are also 
references to redlining based on the racial composition of the 
neighborhood. Reflecting this, Senator Proxmire stated, "our 
financial institutions seem to disdain these older communities, 
especially if they happen to be integrated, or adjacent to poorer 
neighborhoods."11 Senator Proxmire cited the example of Oak Park, 
Illinois, and suburbs like it, which "have trouble finding mortgage 
money because the housing was built 50 years ago, and the 
neighborhood has become integrated."12 
HMDA's supporters opposed redlining on several grounds. 
First, they suggested that it was wrong for banks to take a 
9 Id. at 25, 160; see also id at 25, 162 (statement of Sen. Brooke) (failing to 
lend); 121 CONG. REC. 26,645, 27,622 (1975) (statement of Sen. Brooke) 
(refusing to make loans); 121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,576 (1975) (statement 
of Rep. Stokes) (denying mortgages); id at 34,453 (statement of Rep. 
Murphy) (refusing to make mortgages to qualified applicants); id. at 34,576 
(statement of Rep. Stokes) ("Redlining is a process whereby qualified 
buyers are denied mortgages in certain geographic areas."). 
'
0 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,159-60 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) ("Many, 
if not most lenders-banks and savings and loan associations alike-tend to 
be reluctant to lend mortgage money to older urban neighborhoods."); 121 
CONG. REC. 26,645, 27,622 (1975) (statement of Sen. Brooke) ("[M]any 
mortgage lending institutions were not making mortgage loans in older 
neighborhoods .... "); H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 12 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-
187, at 3, 5 (1975); 121 CONG. REC. 39,861, 40,606 (statement of Sen. 
Proxmire) (discussing the refusal to lend mortgage money in older urban 
neighborhoods); S. REP. No. 94-187, at I (1975) (redlining is a 
"reluctan[ce] to make mortgage loans on existing homes in older urban 
neighborhoods. There is ample demonstration that credit-worthy persons 
are sometimes denied loans on sound homes solely because of the location 
of the property."). 
11 See 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25, 160 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). 
12 121 CONG. REC. 41,103, 41,709 (1975) (statement of Rep. St. Germain) 
(discussing redlining in "ethnic" neighborhoods); id. (statement of Rep. St. 
Germain) (stating that redlining occurs "when certain institutions refuse to 
lend mortgage money in our Nation's older urban and ethnic 
neighborhoods."); H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 11 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-187, 
at 3 (1975). 
2009-2010 HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT TURNS THIRTY-FIVE 211 
community's deposits without lending to that community. 13 Senator 
Proxmire expressed this judgment, stating, "[t]he extreme irony is 
that often the banks and savings and loan associations located in 
these older neighborhoods draw their deposits from precisely those 
communities that cannot get loans."14 HMDA's supporters in the 
House felt the same way. Representative Badillo stated, "[t]hey took 
the money of depositors who resided in central city areas, redlined 
their neighborhoods, and invested the funds in new housing in the 
suburbs."15 
Second, supporters of HMDA argued that redlining was 
inconsistent with banks' charter responsibilities. The basis of this 
position was that entry into the banking industry was restricted to 
entities that had a charter granted by a governmental entity, and that 
in return for the privilege to do business granted by the charter, banks 
had an obligation to serve the needs of their communities by making 
loans there. 16 Senator Brooke was clear about this: "These 
institutions operate under charters issued by financial regulatory 
agencies which restrict entry into the business on a geographic basis. 
They are supposed to serve the area in which they are located, not 
only to obtain deposits but also to make loans." 17 
13 This sentiment was expressed in the Report of the House Committee on 
Banking, Currency, and Housing: 
In many instances, after years of placing their savings in 
local financial institutions, they [the citizens of redlined 
neighborhoods] are now confronted with the inability to 
improve their property, or for prospective neighbors to 
purchase homes. In many instances, the dollars they have 
been saving are being used to develop newer areas, not to 
preserve, maintain and enhance their local ones. 
H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 12 (1975). 
14 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,160 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). 
15 121 CONG. REc. 34,345, 34,577 (1975) (statement of Rep. Badillo). 
16 Congress stated, "depository institutions" have "chartering 
responsibilities to provide adequate home financing to qualified applicants 
on reasonable terms and conditions," and "to serve the housing needs of the 
communities and neighborhoods in which they are located." Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 280l(a)-(b) (2006). Senator Proxmire 
stated, "[a]t the same time, a lender that is chartered to serve a community 
does have an obligation to give some service to that community." 121 
CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,160 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). See S. 
REP. No. 94-187, at 11 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 19 (1975). 
17 121 CONG. REc. 23,935, 25,162 (1975) (statement of Sen. Brooke). 
212 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 29 
Third, HMDA proponents argued that redlining was a cause 
of the deterioration of urban neighborhoods. 18 Senator Proxmire 
described the cycle of disinvestment and deterioration: "When the 
neighborhood cannot get mortgage credit, property values drop; new 
homeowners cannot move in because they cannot get mortgages. 
Eventually, the neighborhood starts to deteriorate and so the lender 
can say: See, I told you so." 19 Representative Badillo was even more 
graphic: "Potential buyers in search of housing left the cities. Their 
going reduced the tax base. Landlords could obtain no funds for 
rehabilitation. The neighborhoods continued to deteriorate. Housing 
values declined, and redlined areas drifted inexorably toward the 
status of demoralizing, dehumanizing, slums." 20 
Fourth, the corollary to the idea that redlining led to 
deterioration-that lack of credit prevented the rebuilding of redlined 
neighborhoods-was also reflected in HMDA's legislative history.21 
Representative Mitchell stated: "I think that if the lending institutions 
would give us some mortgage money and stop redlining, we would 
be ble [sic] to make our communities much more attractive."22 The 
lack of private credit in redlined neighborhoods made it more 
difficult for public housing programs designed to rehabilitate these 
areas to work effectively.23 The report of the House Committee on 
Banking, Currency, and Housing expressed this sentiment clearly: 
"No federal housing program can ever hope to fulfill our twenty-five 
year old national housing goal of a 'decent home and a suitable living 
environment for every American' without a firm commitment from 
the private sector and, most importantly, from our nation's financial 
institutions." 24 
18 According to Congress, redlining "contributed to the decline of certain 
geographic areas." 12 U.S.C. § 280l(a). See 121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 
34,453 (1975) (statement of Rep. Murphy); H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 12 
(1975); S. REP. No. 94-187, at 1, 3 (1975). 
19 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25, 160 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). 
20 121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,577 (1975) (statement of Rep. Badillo). 
21 See id. at 34,576 (statement of Rep. Stokes) ("This bill would thereby 
remove a major obstacle facing decent citizens trying to stabilize and 
revitalize their neighborhoods."). 
22 See id. at 34,567 (statement of Rep. Mitchell). 
23 According to the House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing, 
redlining also "exacerbates the problem of providing public sector 
investments to stabilize and rehabilitate essentially older neighborhoods 
within our cities." H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 4 (1975). 
24 Id. at 11 (1975). 
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Congress' primary purpose in passing HMDA was to end 
redlining and encourage lenders to make loans in redlined neigh-
borhoods through the disclosure of information about the location of 
their home mortgage loans. 25 Senator Proxmire described the means 
and ends Congress had in mind when it passed HMDA: "[HMDA] 
provides a very gentle remedy-disclosure-to a very serious 
national problem, the extreme difficulty of obtaining mortgage credit 
in older urban neighborhoods."26 
HMDA is thus an unusual statute in that it does not imple-
ment Congressional intent the way that proscriptive or ameliorative 
statutes usually do: identify undesirable conduct, prohibit it, create 
remedies and proscribe penalties.27 HMDA does identify redlining as 
undesirable conduct, but it does not prohibit redlining, create 
remedies or proscribe penalties. It does not deprive a bank of its 
h "f . . dl. . 28 . b k 1 1 29 c arter i it practices re mmg, require a an to ma (e a oan, or 
allocate credit.30 Instead, HMDA relies on the power of public 
25 Senator Tunney stated: 
It is clear that our present efforts, both at the State and 
Federal level, represent a start, but only a start, in dealing 
with the phenomenon of urban decay as it results from 
lending practices. However, we must start somewhere, 
and the efforts to collect and analyze information about 
"redlining" represent an intelligent and natural starting 
point. 
121 CONG. REC. 26,645, 27,621 (statement of Sen. Tunney). See id. at 
27,612 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (discussing the rights of depositors). 
Representative Mitchell stated, "the private sector will never do its job if 
[HMDA is not passed]," 121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,567 (1975) (statement 
of Rep. Mitchell); 121 CONG. REC. 26,645, 27,622 (I 975) (statement of 
Sen. Brooke); 121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,576 (1975) (statement of Rep. 
Stokes). See H.R. REP. No. 94-561 at 1 I, 14, 20 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-
187, at I, 10 (1975). 
26 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,159 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). 
27 See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006); Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-169lf (2006). These statutes prohibit 
lending discrimination, provide for private and governmental remedies, and 
proscribe penalties. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
28 121 CONG. REc. 26,645, 27,612 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). 
29 Id. ("It would not require a bank to make any loan at all."). 
30 HMDA states: "Nothing in this title ... is intended to, nor shall it be 
construed to, encourage unsound lending practices or the allocation of 
credit." I 2 U .S.C. § 280 I ( c) (2006). Senator Brooke stated, "[ n ]or does any 
member of our committee urge a system of credit allocation under which 
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disclosure to remedy the undesirable conduct. HMDA's purpose is to 
"provide the citizens and public officials of the United States with 
sufficient information to enable them to determine whether 
depository institutions are filling their obligations to serve the 
housing needs of the communities and neighborhoods in which they 
are located .... "31 
Congress hoped that requiring banks to disclose the location 
of their home mortgage loans would help end redlining.32 Senator 
Proxmire cited evidence that disclosure has this effect, noting, 
"disclosure in Baltimore produced a 50-percent increase in mortgage 
lending. Similar patterns have been shown in Chicago and in Los 
Angeles, as the consequence of disclosure programs in those areas."33 
Disclosure could help in several ways. First, public 
disclosure would help community groups in their efforts to pressure 
banks to make home mortgage loans in their communities. 34 
Representative Stokes described how this would work: 
mortgage lending institutions are directed to invest a certain percentage of 
their funds in older neighborhoods." 121 CONG. REc. 23,935, 25, 162 ( 1975) 
(statement of Sen. Brooke). According to Senator Proxmire, "we are not 
telling the banks they have to make a loan. We are just saying, disclose what 
you do; just let us know." 121 CONG. REC. 26,645, 27,612 (1975) 
(statement of Sen. Proxmire). Senator Tunney stated that HMDA "does not 
force the allocation of credit by our Nation's lending institutions, nor does it 
represent a first step in such credit allocation." Id. at 27,621 (statement of 
Sen. Tunney). 
31 12 U.S.C. § 2801(b). Senator Brooke stated that under HMDA, banks' 
"depositors and the public at large will be given an opportunity to assess the 
lending policies of these institutions by looking at the areas in which they 
make mortgage loans." 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,162 (1975) (statement 
of Sen. Brooke). 
32 According to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, "disclosure is a mild remedy that will have the effect of 
encouraging institutions to become more community-minded." S. REP. No. 
94-187, at 10 (1975). 
33 121 CONG. REC. 26,645, 27,606 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). 
34 According to Senator Proxmire, "[t]he intent here is that citizens and 
public officials will be more successful in discouraging the practice of 'red-
lining' or the refusal to lend mortgage money in older urban neighborhoods 
if they are armed with the facts." 121 CONG. REC. 40,047, 40,606 (1975) 
(statement of Sen. Proxmire). According to Representative St. Germain, 
"[b ]y requiring financial institutions to publicly disclose by geographic area 
the number and dollar amount of home mortgage loans we will enable 
citizens and public officials-by arming them with the facts-to combat 
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[HMDA data] will give people the tools to identify 
the problems in their neighborhoods and to begin to 
solve them. It will allow people to have a voice in 
what happens to their neighborhoods .... It will 
give people a fighting chance to maintain their most 
valuable asset-their homes.35 
Second, community residents could refuse to place deposits with 
banks that did not lend in their neighborhoods.36 Senator Brooke 
described how this would work: 
In some cities, neighborhood groups have organized 
to persuade their local lending institutions to make 
more mortgage credit available in their areas. They 
argue persuasively that they should be able to make 
an educated judgment about where they will deposit 
their savings based on the probability of their being 
able to obtain mortgage loans from the institutions in 
which they have made deposits.37 
what has come to be known as 'redlining' .... " 121 CONG. REC. 41103, 
41,709 (1975) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). See H.R. REP. No. 94-561, 
at 14, 20 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-187, at 1-2 (1975); see also Richard D. 
Marsico, Fighting Poverty Through Community Empowerment and 
Economic Development: The Role of the Community Reinvestment and 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Acts, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 281, 293 
(1995) (describing the purpose of HMDA and the public's use of HMDA 
data). 
35 121 CONG. REc. 34,345, 34,576 (1975) (statement of Rep. Stokes). 
36 HMDA "would use the power of market competition-competition for 
the saver's dollar-to encourage lenders to do a better job in their own 
backyards." 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,160 (1975) (statement of Sen. 
Proxmire). Senator Proxmire stated, "I think the time has come to let some 
sunshine in; to provide information to consumers in these neighborhoods 
that have been arbitrarily denied credit, and to let the marketplace decide 
which lenders deserve their business. That is all ... [HMDA] does." Id. at 
25,166 (statement of Sen. Proxmire). He further stated, "I believe that if 
depositors are able to learn, through disclosure, which local lenders are 
treating the community fairly, lenders will become more accountable. They 
will have a kind of competition for responsibility and for community 
service, community availability." Id. at 25, 160. According to Representative 
Stokes, HMDA will allow people "to know how their money is being used, 
and to channel their own financial resources back into their communities." 
121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,576 (1975) (statement of Rep. Stokes). 
'7 0 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25, 162 ( 1975) (statement of Sen. Brooke). 
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Third, government officials could distribute public sector 
investments in a way that would promote private investment.38 
Finally, banks would be shamed by being publicly identified as 
practicing redlining. Senator Proxmire suspected that one of the 
reasons the banking industry opposed public disclosure of the home 
mortgage lending data was "the embarrassment once this data is 
publicly available .... I think it is the potential embarrassment and 
the accountability to depositors that the industry truly fears .... "39 
B. Initial Provisions of HMDA 
As initially passed, HMDA was limited in scope. It covered 
banks and non-bank mortgage lenders that were majority-owned by 
banks. HMDA required these lenders to report only the location of 
their home mortgage loans. It did not, however, require lenders to 
disclose any information about the demand for loans, including, for 
example, the number of loan applications they received. Although 
amendments to HMDA in 1980 and 1988 expanded its coverage and 
usefulness, the amendments did not address this issue. As a result, 
HMDA was limited as a tool to detect and deter redlining because 
lenders defended small numbers of home mortgage loans in low-
income and predominantly minority neighborhoods as the result of 
the lack of home mortgage loan applications from those neigh-
borhoods, and the Fed accepted these arguments. 
38 12 U.S.C. § 280l(b). HMDA "would also provide information to 
municipal officials concerned with housing, on the effects of local credit 
flows." 121 CONG. REc. 23,935, 25,160 (1975) (statement of Sen. 
Proxmire). "Additionally, ... [HMDA] will help the Congress in making 
some decisions about where various community development funds should 
go." 121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,567 (1975) (statement of Rep. Mitchell). 
See H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 14 (1975); 121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,455 
(1975) (statement of Rep. St. Germain) ("[T]he purpose of ... [HMDA] is 
to provide at long last the information necessary for the private citizens, 
financial institutions, all levels of government working cooperatively to 
devise ways and means to stabilize neighborhoods in virtually every city so 
that the day will soon come again when private capital essential for ordinary 
economic growth once again returns to our cities."). 
39 121 CONG. REc. 23,935, 25,161 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). 
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1. Initial HMDA Coverage 
As originally passed, HMDA covered "depository institu-
tions," defined as commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan 
associations and credit unions that made federally related mortgage 
loans.40 The Fed issued regulations that deemed majority-owned 
subsidiaries of depository institutions as part of their parent 
institutions.41 Depository institutions were required to report data if 
they had a branch or home office in a standard metropolitan 
statistical area,42 made federally related mortgage loans43 and had 
assets of $10,000,000 or more.44 
2. Initial Reporting Requirements 
Initially, HMDA required covered lenders to report several 
categories of information about their home mortgage loans. First, 
HMDA required covered lenders to report the total number and 
dollar value of mortgage loans they originated or purchased each 
year.45 Second, for mortgage loans within a metropolitan area in 
which the lender had a home or branch office, the lender was 
required to report the total number and dollar value of mortgage 
loans by census tract when census tract information was available at 
40 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, § 303(2), 
89 Stat. 1124, 1125 (1975) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2802(2) 
(2006)). 
41 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(c) (1978). 
42 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act § 304(a)(l) (1975); 12 C.F.R. § 
203.3(a)(2) (1978). 
43 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act § 303(2) (1975). The Fed defined a 
"federally related mortgage loan" as any loan, other than temporary 
financing such as a construction loan, that is secured by a first lien on one-
to-four family residential property and is made in whole or in part by an 
institution whose deposits are insured by the federal government or that is 
regulated by the federal government; or that was guaranteed or insured by 
the federal government; or a loan intended to be sold to a govemment-
sponsored enterprise. 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(d) (1978). 
44 12 C.F.R. § 203.3(a)(l) (1978). 
45 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act § 304(a)(I) (1975). Mortgage loans were 
defined as loans secured by a first lien on residential real property, including 
first lien refinancing loans and home improvement loans. Id. at§ 303(1); 12 
C.F .R. § § 203 .2(f)-(i) ( 1978). Residential real property included one-to-four 
family homes and multi-family dwellings. Id. at§ 203.2(i). 
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reasonable cost, otherwise by zip code.46 Finally, HMDA required 
lenders to report the total number and dollar value of their mortgage 
loans on one-to-four family homes that were insured or guaranteed 
by the federal government, made to borrowers who did not intend to 
occupy the property, or for home improvement.47 
C. HMDA Expansion from 1980 to 1988 
In 1980, Congress amended HMDA to make the data more 
accessible and useful. Perhaps the most significant amendment 
required the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
("FFIEC") to compile aggregate HMDA data for all HMDA 
reporters in each metropolitan area.48 The legislation required the 
FFIEC to provide the aggregate information by census tract and by 
groups of census tracts categorized by income level and racial 
composition (for example, less than I 0 percent minority, 10-75 
percent minority and greater than 75 percent minority).49 These 
aggregate tables were intended to make HMDA much more useful as 
a tool for identifying overall lending patterns in a metropolitan area, 
identifying the lending patterns of individual lenders, measuring 
improvement and helping public officials develop housing and 
community development programs.50 Additionally, the aggregate 
tables allowed for evaluations of the performance of an individual 
lender compared with all lenders.51 
Congress passed three additional important amendments 
during these years. First, it required covered lenders to report the 
geographic distribution of most of their HMDA loans by census 
tract.52 Previously, zip code reporting was permitted if reporting by 
46 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act § 304(a)(2)(A) (1975); 12 C.F.R. § 
203.4(a)(I) (1978). 
47 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act § 304(b) (1975); 12 C.F.R. § 
203(a)(l)(i)-(vi) (1978). 
48 Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-399, 
§ 340(c), 94 Stat. 1614 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2809(a) 
(2006)). 
49 See S. REP. No. 96-736, at 33-34 (1980). 
50 Id. 
51 See id. 
52 Housing and Community Development Act § 340(a) (1980). The 
legislation required banks to report their home mortgage loans by census 
tract in counties with a population of greater than 30,000 and by county 
name in counties with a population less than 30,000. Id. 
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census tract was unreasonably expensive. Census tracts are generally 
smaller than zip codes, and more accurately reflect the racial 
composition and economic level of the neighborhoods where a lender 
made its loans. This change thus made it easier to identify lending 
patterns by race and income. Second, Congress required the FFIEC 
to create central HMDA data depositories in each metropolitan 
area.
53 These central depositories would contain all HMDA data for 
all HMDA reporters in each metropolitan area, allowing residents 
easier access to all the lending data for all lenders in their 
1. 54 metropo rtan area. 
In 1988, Congress amended HMDA once again, expanding it 
by increasing the number of lenders subject to its disclosure 
requirements. The 1988 amendments expanded HMDA to cover 
mortgage banking subsidiaries of bank holding companies or savings 
and loan holding companies and savings and loan service 
corporations that originate or purchase mortgage loans. 55 Previously, 
HMDA covered mortgage banks only if they were majority-owned 
by banks.56 
D. Uses ofHMDA Data from 1975 to1988 
The data released during this first phase of HMDA's history 
were useful but had limitations. This data could be analyzed in many 
ways, frequently in conjunction with other publicly available data 
such as the median income and racial composition of census tracts 
and the amount of deposits in bank branches. For example, the data 
could show: 1) the total number and dollar value of home mortgage 
loans that the bank made in low-income or predominantly minority 
neighborhoods compared with its number and dollar value of loans in 
upper-mcome or white neighborhoods; 2) the percentage of the 
53 Id. 
54 Home Mortgage Disclosure; Revision of Regulation C and Aggregation 
Tables, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,780, 11,786 (Feb. 10, 1981) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 203). Before the Internet, which now gives access to all HMDA 
data for all covered lenders and all metropolitan areas, these central 
depositories were the only place to collect such data. HMDA data are now 
available at the website of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council, www.ffiec.gov. 
55 Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, 
§ 565(a)(l), 101 Stat. 1815 (1987) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 
2802). 
56 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
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bank's loans m low-income or predominantly minority 
neighborhoods compared with its percentage in upper-income or 
white neighborhoods; and 3) the percentage of the bank's loans in 
low-income or predominantly minority communities compared with 
other banks' percentages.57 HMDA data could also be used to 
calculate a bank's "loan-to-deposit ratio" ("LDR")58 and compare the 
bank's LDR with the LDRs of other banks. Frequently, these 
analyses showed that a bank made proportionately fewer loans in 
low-income and predominantly minority communities than in upper-
income or white communities, its percentages of loans in low-income 
and minority communities was lower than other banks', or that it had 
a low LDR either in absolute terms or relative to other banks.59 
The Fed, however, questioned whether any of these findings 
showed redlining. The Fed stated that HMDA data were limited in 
their ability to show redlining because the data did not show the 
creditworthiness of the loan applicant, the level of the demand for 
loans or any other information about the bank's other types of 
loans. 60 The Fed also questioned the meaning of a low LDR, stating 
that there may be many reasons a neighborhood might generate more 
deposits than loans. 61 
The irony with this is that the Fed found that the data that 
Congress required lenders to disclose to show whether they were 
redlining were insufficient to determine whether they were in fact 
redlining-even though on their face the data showed evidence that 
lenders were redlining as Congress suspected. The Fed's approach, 
although perhaps ironic, was not entirely unreasonable because the 
data, standing alone, were insufficient to prove redlining. Notably 
lacking was information about the demand for loans, the borrower's 
creditworthiness and the value of the collateral. 
Even though the Fed's view of HMDA data was not 
unreasonable, the problem with the Fed's response to the data was 
that the Fed did not treat disproportionately low lending in 
predominantly minority or low-income neighborhoods as evidence 
57 See Richard Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvestment 
Act, 20 FORD. URB. L. J. 165, 230-32 (1993) [hereinafter CRA Guide]. 
58 The LDR measures the dollar amount of a bank's home mortgage loans in 
a community as a percentage of the community's deposits in the bank's 
branches in that community. Id. at 234. 
59 See id. at 233-35. 
60 See id. at 238-39. 
61 Id. at 235. 
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that redlining might exist and that further investigation was 
necessary. The Fed did not take the next step and investigate whether 
lower lending rates in predominantly minority neighborhoods were 
the result of redlining. The Fed and the other federal agencies 
responsible for enforcing statutes intended to address redlining or 
lending discrimination-including the Community Reinvestment Act 
of 1977 ("CRA"),62 the FHA,63 and the ECOA64-did not pursue 
62 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (2006). The CRA requires banks to meet the credit 
needs of the local communities they serve, including low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods. Id. at§ 290l(b). Four federal agencies-the Fed, the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and 
the Office of Thrift Supervision-divide CRA enforcement responsibility 
by periodically reviewing the record of the banks they supervise to 
determine whether they meet community credit needs and then taking that 
record into account when considering bank expansion applications. Id. at§§ 
2901(1), 2903(a)(l)-(2). 
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2006). The FHA prohibits discrimination in the 
sale, rental or terms and conditions of the sale or rental of housing on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin or 
disability. Id. at § 3604(a), (b), (f). FHA also prohibits discrimination in 
residential real estate-related transactions, including making such 
transactions available and their terms and conditions, on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin. Id. at § 
3605(a). Residential real estate-related transactions include making loans or 
providing other financial assistance for purchasing, constructing, improving, 
repairing or maintaining a dwelling. Id. at § 3605(b ). The FHA has been 
construed to prohibit redlining. See Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 
408 F. Supp. 489, 494 (S.D. Ohio 1976). The Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development has broad enforcement authority over FHA, including 
commencing administrative complaints, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a), initiating 
investigations, issuing subpoenas and ordering discovery in aid of 
investigations. Id. at § 3611. The Attorney General of the United States has 
the authority to commence lawsuits challenging a pattern or practice of 
discrimination. Id. at§ 3614(a). 
64 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f(2006). The ECOA prohibits any creditor from 
discriminating in any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race, 
color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status or age. Id. at § 1691 (a). 
General enforcement authority of the ECOA is in the hands of the Federal 
Trade Commission, id. at § 169lc(c), but several other agencies, including 
the agencies that enforce the CRA, are authorized to enforce the ECOA with 
respect to entities under their jurisdiction, id. at §§ 169lc(a), (a)(l). The 
Attorney General of the United States also has the authority to commence 
lawsuits challenging a pattern and practice of discrimination. Id. at § 
1691e(h). 
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additional data or remedies, which were available to them as 
enforcement agencies, that could have shown whether the lending 
disparities were the result of discrimination. Nor did they use their 
enforcement authority to bring discrimination lawsuits under the 
FHA or the ECOA, or to deny bank mergers under the CRA.65 It was 
not until 1992, after the 1989 amendments to HMDA expanded its 
disclosure requirements, that these agencies took a more aggressive 
stance toward disproportionately low lending in minority and low-
income communities. 
III. HMDA Revolution: 1989-2002 
The year 1989 was a watershed year for HMDA. Congress 
passed three significant amendments to HMDA that year, which 
helped trigger a revolution in the home mortgage lending market. 
The amendments increased the number of lenders subject to 
HMDA's reporting requirements and expanded the data disclosure 
requirements to include the number of home mortgage loan 
applications lenders received, the race and income of each applicant 
and the location of the neighborhood in which the property that was 
the subject of the loan application was located. With this amendment, 
not only did Congress expand HMDA's coverage, but it expanded 
HMDA's mission to include detecting and preventing lending 
discrimination. Within a few years of these amendments, the market 
share of loans to African-Americans, Latinos, low-income 
individuals, and low-income and predominantly minority 
neighborhoods had increased dramatically. 
A. 1989 Amendments to HMDA 
First, Congress expanded HMDA to cover "other lending 
institutions," which are defined to include "any person engaged for 
profit in the business of mortgage lending."66 Under this amendment, 
65 RICHARD 0. MARSICO, DEMOCRA TTZING CAPTT AL: THE HISTORY, LAW, 
AND REFORM OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 58-59 (2005) 
[hereinafter DEMOCRATIZING CA PTT AL]. 
66 Financial Institution Recovery, Reform, and Enforcement Act, H.R. 1278, 
lOlst Cong. § 12ll(d)-(e) (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 
2802(4) (2006)). The Fed subsequently issued regulations that defined a 
non-bank lending institution as an institution whose home purchase loan 
originations equaled or exceeded I 0 percent of its loan originations, 
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non-depository home mortgage lenders that were not subsidiaries of 
banks or savings and loan holding companies were now covered by 
HMDA. The Fed stated that Congress passed this amendment in an 
attempt "to cover a wide range of lenders in order to capture the 
fullest possible information regarding mortgage lending patterns."67 
Second, the amendments required lenders to report the total 
number and dollar amount of home mortgage applications they 
received.68 Regulations issued by the Fed required lenders to disclose 
their decision on each application.69 
Third, the amendments required lenders to disclose the total 
number and dollar amount of their home mortgage loan originations 
and applications, grouped according to census tract and the income 
level, racial characteristics and gender of each applicant and 
borrower. 7° Congress passed this amendment to make HMDA a more 
effective tool in identifying lending discrimination and enforcing the 
antidiscrimination laws.71 The Fed reflected this in the regulations it 
issued to implement the amendments, stating in the preamble that 
one of the purposes of HMDA is "[t]o assist in identifying possible 
discriminatory lending patterns and enforcing antidiscrimination 
statutes."72 Congress passed these amendments as part of the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989,73 an earlier version of the 2008 financial bailout. 
Representative Joseph Kennedy, in a statement expressing the 
purpose of HMDA amendments, and relevant to current proposals to 
reform HMDA, stated: 
[l]t is 2 to 3 times harder if the color of your skin 
happens to be black or brown than if the color of 
your skin is white ... to receive a home mortgage. It 
does seem to me if we are pumping in over $200 
measured in dollars. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,356, 51,363 (Dec. 15, 1989) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 203). 
67 Id. at 51,359. 
68 H.R. 1278, § 12ll(c) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(l)(2)). 
69 54 Fed. Reg. at 51,356. 
70 H.R. 1278, § 12ll(a)(3) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4)). 
This requirement did not apply to lenders with $30 million or less in assets. 
Id. at§ 121 lG) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2803(i)). 
71 H.R. REP. No. 101-222, at 458 (1989) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1989 
U.S.C.C.A.N 432, 497. See 54 Fed. Reg. at 51,357. 
72 54 Fed. Reg. at 51,362. 
73 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). 
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billion into the savings and loan industry and into 
our nation's financial institutions, that the very least 
we could expect is that we do not continue a pattern 
of discrimination that may exist .... "74 
Vol. 29 
B. Additional HMDA Amendments: 1991-1996 
Between 1991 and 1996, Congress made four amendments to 
HMDA; three expanded HMDA and one contracted it. In 1992, the 
Fed, acting pursuant to Congressional amendment, once again 
increased the number of non-depository home mortgage lenders 
subject to HMDA by adding an alternative test for determining 
whether such a lender was covered. These lenders would be subject 
to HMDA if their assets, combined with any corporate parent, met 
the existing$ I 0 million asset test, or, in the alternative, if they made 
100 home mortgage loans, including refinancings, in the previous 
year.75 This amendment was intended to include within HMDA more 
non-depository mortgage lenders that sell the loans they originate 
rather than hold them in their portfolios, thus limiting their total 
assets. 76 
In 1992, Congress amended HMDA to require covered 
lenders to make available to the public a list of all the loan 
applications they received, organized by census tract, and including 
all data required by HMDA (the "loan application register"), to 
require lenders to make their HMDA data available to the public 
within three days of receiving them from the FFIEC, and to require 
the FFIEC to make HMDA data available to the public by September 
I of each year. 77 The purpose of these provisions was "to encourage 
the relevant federal agencies to expedite the processing, analysis, and 
dissemination of HMDA data and make it [sic] available to the 
public at the earliest possible time."78 Congress wanted to "ensure 
that the public receives useful and timely information regarding the 
lending record of financial institutions" that would "assist in efforts 
74 135 CONG. REC. H.2739-03 (1989) (statement of Rep. Kennedy). 
75 57 Fed. Reg. 56,963, 56,963 (Dec. 2, 1992) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 
203.3(a)(2)). 
76 Id. at 56,964. 
77 Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, H. 5334, 102nd 
Cong.§ 932(a)-(b) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2803U)-(l)). 
78 H.R. REP. No. 102-760, at 160 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3281, 3440. 
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to enforce the fair lending laws."79 Congress also believed that 
orgamzmg loan application registers by census tract would 
"significantly add to their utility as a research tool .... "80 
In 1995, the Fed amended its HMDA regulations to require 
banks that are obligated under the CRA to report their small business 
loans to collect and report the geographic location of the applications 
and loans on any property outside the Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
("MSAs") in which they had a home or branch office, or outside any 
MSA.81 The Board adopted these expanded reporting requirements to 
"provide information about lenders' overall mortgage lending 
activity that will assist in developing a more accurate CRA 
assessment."82 
In 1996, Congress contracted HMDA's coverage; this was 
the first, and remains the only, time Congress or the Fed decreased 
the number of lenders covered by HMDA. Congress made a one-time 
adjustment in the lending asset threshold that triggered reporting 
obligations for depository institutions, increasing the $10 million 
threshold by the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index 
("CPI") from 197 5 through 1996. 83 For each year after 1996, the 
asset threshold would increase by that year's CPI percentage 
increase. 84 
C. New Uses ofHMDA Data and the Fed's Response 
The amendments to HMDA during the second phase of its 
history, particularly the 1989 HMDA amendments, made several new 
analyses of HMDA data possible. One analysis compares a bank's 
rate of rejecting home mortgage loan applications for property in 
predominantly minority neighborhoods or from minority applicants 
with its rate of rejecting applications for property in predominantly 
79 Id. at 159. 
80 Id. 
81 60 Fed. Reg. 22,223, 22,225 (May 4, 1995) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 
203.4(e)). 
82 Id. at 22,224. 
83 See H.R. 3610, 104th Cong. § I IO(a) (1996) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. § 2808(b)(2)). 
84 12 U.S.C. § 2808(b )(I) (2006). The 2009 threshold is $39 million. 73 
Fed. Reg. 78,587, 78,616 (Dec. 23, 2008). 
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white neighborhoods or from white applicants.85 A second common 
analysis compares a bank's minority neighborhood/white neigh-
borhood or minority applicant/white applicant loan application 
rejection rate ratio with the same ratio for all lenders in the bank's 
community.86 A third common analysis compares the percentage of a 
bank's loans to predominantly minority neighborhoods or minority 
borrowers with the aggregate percentages for all lenders in the bank's 
• 87 
commumty. 
Once again, the Fed was initially hesitant to use the new 
HMDA data the way Congress intended-to detect discriminatory 
home mortgage lending. If, for example, a bank made a lower 
percentage of loans to predominantly minority neighborhoods than 
the aggregate percentage, or if it had a higher African-American/ 
white denial rate ratio than the aggregate, this was rarely enough to 
give the bank a failing CRA rating or to derail its merger 
application.88 The Fed explained, "HMDA data ... provide only 
limited information about the covered loans. HMDA data, therefore, 
have limitations that make them an inadequate basis, absent other 
information, for concluding that an institution has not assisted 
85 Congress had this sort of comparison in mind when it passed the 1989 
HMDA amendments: "An especially significant change to HMDA is the 
new requirement for disclosure of information on completed applications. 
Collection of data on completed applications will permit comparison of 
acceptance and rejected statistics." H.R. REP. No. 101-222, at 459 (1989) 
(Conf. Rep.). 
86 See, e.g., Richard D. Marsico, Patterns of Lending to Low-Income and 
Minority Persons and Neighborhoods: The 1999 New York Metropolitan 
Area Mortgage Lending Scorecard, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 199, 239-
45 (2000) [hereinafter Patterns of Lending]. For example, if a bank rejects 
forty percent of applications from African-Americans and twenty percent 
from whites, its rejection rate ratio is two. This ratio is then compared to the 
aggregate ratio for all lenders in the bank's community. 
87 Id. For example, the data make it possible to determine the percentage of 
a lender's loans to African-Americans or to predominantly minority 
neighborhoods and compare it with the percentage of loans to the same 
groups by all lenders in the bank's community. 
88 See DEMOCRATIZING CAPITAL, supra note 65, at 106-13; CRA Guide, 
supra note 57, at 237-41. Under the CRA, all banks are evaluated 
periodically for their record at meeting the credit needs of their community. 
12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(l) (2006). A bank must apply to the federal banking 
agency that regulates it for permission to merge with another bank. 12 
U.S.C. §§ 2902(3)(e), 2903(a)(2) (2006). The bank's CRA record is relevant 
to the agency's consideration of its application. 12 U .S.C. § 2903(a)(2). 
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adequately in meeting its community's [sic] credit needs or has 
engaged in illegal lending discrimination."89 According to the Fed, 
the reason HMDA data is inadequate is that they do not contain 
information about the creditworthiness of the borrower, the value of 
the collateral or other important information about the loan.90 
Nevertheless, by the mid-l 990s, the Fed no longer 
completely discounted the evidence of lending discrimination 
derived from HMDA data. The Fed finally stated that HMDA data 
could be used to help identify banks to investigate for possible 
lending discrimination, something it had not been willing to admit 
prior to the 1989 amendments. 91 The Fed conceded, for example, that 
if a bank's HMDA data showed significant differences in rejection 
rates or lending percentages based on race, further analyses, such as 
comparative analyses of loan application files of minorities and 
whites, would be merited.92 
C. The Impact of the New HMDA Data93 
Data under the 1989 HMDA amendments were released in 
late 1991. The data showed that in 1990 lenders rejected home 
mortgage loan applications from African-Americans more than twice 
as frequently as from whites, nearly 1.5 more frequently from 
Latinos, and twice as frequently for property in predominantly 
minority neighborhoods than for property in predominantly white 
neighborhoods.94 These disclosures triggered a chain reaction. 
Journalists, community groups, and academics published studies that 
89 DEMOCRATIZING CAPTT AL, supra note 65, at 110 (quoting Legal 
Developments, Wells Fargo & Co., 86 FED. RESERVE BULLETIN 832, 845 
(2000)). 
9
° CRA Guide, supra note 57, at 238-39. 
91 Id. at 239. 
92 Id. 
93 For a more detailed discussion of the impact of the release of this data, 
see Richard D. Marsico, Shedding Some Light on Lending: The Effect of 
Expanded Disclosure Laws on Home Mortgage Marketing, Lending, and 
Discrimination in the New York Metropolitan Area, 27 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 
481 (1999) [hereinafter Shedding Some Light on Lending]; DEMOCRATIZING 
CAPITAL, supra note 65, at 168-72. 
94 Glenn B. Canner et al., Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Expanded Data 
on Residential Lending, 77 FED. RESERVE BULLETIN 859, 870 tbl.6 (1991). 
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confirmed the results in their localities.95 Community groups 
increased their advocacy efforts with banks and government 
. 96 
agencies. 
Governmental agencies followed these disclosures with 
strengthened enforcement of the CRA, the FHA, and other related 
laws. 97 For example, the federal banking agencies tightened their 
review of bank CRA records and bank merger applications by 
issuing fewer passing grades on CRA examinations of banks and 
denying more merger applications on CRA grounds.98 They also 
adopted stronger CRA regulations that focused more scrutiny on 
bank lending, investment and service records as opposed to focusing 
on lending efforts and procedures, as the previous regulations had 
done.99 The Attorney General filed its first lending discrimination 
case against a bank, followed by twelve more lending discrimination 
cases that covered all aspects of the home mortgage lending process 
and a wide range of lenders. 100 
Lenders, in response to the negative publicity and the 
increased governmental enforcement efforts, took several steps to 
increase their lending to minority and low-income persons and 
neighborhoods, including creating new lending programs, adopting 
different loan eligibility criteria and increasing their outreach 
efforts. 101 The results were dramatic. From 1991 to 1998, the overall 
95 Jaret Seiberg, Banks Making Good Progress In Their Fair-Lending 
Efforts, 166 AM. BANKER 1, 10 (Sept. 16, 1996) ("The first year's [HMDA] 
data, which covered 1990, focused public attention on disparate rejection 
rates for whites and minorities. The numbers were publicized on the front 
pages of newspapers across the country-and immediately drew charges of 
bias from activists."). See, e.g., Joel Glenn Brenner & Liz Spayd, A Pattern 
of Bias in Mortgage Loans, WASH. POST, June 6, 1993, at Al; David R. 
Sands, D.C. Banks Said to Favor White-Area Investments, WASH. TIMES, 
June 5, 1992, at A2. 
96 See Shedding Some Light on Lending, supra note 93, at 499-502. 
97 See id at 502-11 for a more complete description of these efforts. 
98 Id. at 507, 507 n.95. The federal banking agencies awarded satisfactory 
CRA ratings to 89% of banks in 1992, down from 98% prior to June 30, 
1990. Id at 507 n.94. They also denied at least ten applications on CRA 
grounds between 1992 and 1995, at least as many as they had denied in the 
previous history of the CRA. Id. at 506 n.95. 
99 Id. at 508-09. 
100 See Shedding Some Light on Lending, supra note 93, at 503-05 & nn.73-
83 for a complete list and description of these cases. 
101 Id. at 511-13. 
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market share of home mortgage loan approvals held by African-
Americans, Latinos, LMI individuals, predominantly minority 
neighborhoods and low-income neighborhoods increased by 68%, 
20%, 36%, 8% and 28%, respectively. 102 
IV. 2002-2010: HMDA Comes Full Circle-Detecting and 
Preventing Reverse Redlining 
In 2002, the Fed made several significant amendments to 
HMDA regulations-effective for data collected in 2004-that 
increased the number of lenders HMDA covers and expanded and 
enhanced the information they must disclose. 103 The purposes of the 
2002 amendments were to improve HMDA's effectiveness as a tool 
for fair lending enforcement and to gather data that would more 
comprehensively and accurately describe the home mortgage market, 
including the subprime home loan market. 104 Once again, the Fed 
expanded HMDA's coverage and its mission, this time to include 
detecting and preventing reverse redlining in the form of 
disproportionately higher rates of higher cost subprime loans in 
predominantly minority neighborhoods. In some ways, HMDA's 
purpose had come full circle, from detecting and eliminating 
redlining in the form of a bank's failure to lend, to detecting and 
preventing reverse redlining in the form of too many high-cost loans. 
A. Interest Rates on Loans 
The late 1990s and early 2000s saw tremendous growth in 
subprime lending. 105 With this growth came allegations that subprime 
lOZ DEMOCRATIZING CAPITAL, supra note 65, at 171 tbl.7.7. 
103 Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 7222, 7222 (Feb. 15, 2002) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 203) (amending Regulation C (Home Mortgage 
Disclosure) to increase disclosure requirements under HMDA and "expand 
the coverage of nondepository lenders by adding a $25 million dollar 
volume test to the existing percentage-based coverage test"). The 
amendments became effective for data collected after January 1, 2004. 
Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 30,771, 30, 771 (May 8, 2002) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 203). 
104 Subprime loans are loans at higher interest rates to borrowers whom 
lenders deem to be higher default risks because of factors such as a weak 
credit history. Patterns of Lending, supra note 86, at 200. 
105 See Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 7228; Robert B. Avery 
& Glenn B. Canner, New Information Reported Under HMDA and its 
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loans were disproportionately distributed among borrowers by race, 
with African-Americans and Latinos receiving higher shares. 106 
There was suspicion that this distribution pattern was not based on 
creditworthiness but on race. 107 In essence, this claim was one of 
reverse redlining. Now, low-income and predominantly minority 
communities were not receiving too few loans, they were receiving 
too many. The most important of the Fed's 2002 regulatory 
amendments addressed this issue. It required lenders to report the 
annual percentage rates ("APR") on first lien home mortgage loans 
when the APR is at least three percentage points higher than the yield 
on Treasury securities with comparable periods of maturity, and it 
required lenders to report the APR on subordinate lien home 
mortgage loans when the APR is at least five percentage points 
higher. 108 These amendments were intended to provide information 
about the subprime lending market. The Fed, in creating the interest 
rate reporting requirements, determined that most first and second 
lien loans that met the APR reporting triggers were subprime. 109 
The new data allow researchers to analyze subprime lending 
distribution patterns based on the race or income of borrowers and 
the racial composition or income level of the neighborhoods in which 
the property is located. For example, it is now possible to compare 
the percentage of home mortgage loans that African-Americans or 
Latinos receive that are subprime with the percentage of loans that 
whites receive that are subprime. It is also possible to identify lenders 
whose percentage of subprime home mortgage loans to minorities or 
predominantly minority neighborhoods are higher than the aggregate 
Application in Fair Lending Enforcement, 91 FED. RES. BULL. 344, 349 
(2005) (discussing one industry source's estimate that the annual dollar 
volume of subprime lending increased from $5 billion in 1994 to over $530 
billion in 2004). 
106 See, e.g., Patterns of Lending, supra note 86, at 200-01, 235, 268. 
107 See, e.g., JIM CAMPEN, BORROWING TROUBLE? V: SUBPRIME MORTGAGE 
LENDING IN GREATER BOSTON, 2000-03 (2005). See generally CALVIN 
BRADFORD, RISK OR RACE? RACIAL DISPARITIES AND THE SUBPRIME 
REFINANCE MARKET (2002); DANIEL IMMERGLUCK & MARTT WILES, Two 
STEPS BACK: THE DUAL MORTGAGE MARKET, PREDATORY LENDING, AND 
THE UNDOING OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (1999); U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. 
AND URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN 
SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA (2000). 
108 Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 43,217, 43,219-20, 43,223 
(June 27, 2002) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(l2)). 
109 Id. at 43,219-20. 
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percentage for all lenders. The results of these analyses can help 
indicate whether there is reverse-redlining in the home mortgage loan 
market and whether particular lenders might be engaging in reverse-
redlining. Up until this amendment, studies of subprime lending were 
much less precise. Analysts could not use HMDA data to determine 
whether a loan was subprime, so they generally counted a loan as 
subprime if it was made by a subprime lender as identified by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") and 
counted loans by all other lenders as prime. 110 The problem with such 
studies was that subprime lenders also make prime loans and prime 
lenders also make subprime loans. 
When the Fed required lenders to disclose the APR on home 
mortgage loans, it decided not to require them to disclose the 
borrower's credit score, which would have made the APR data a 
much more useful tool for detecting unfair lending practices in the 
subprime lending market, one of the Fed's stated reasons for 
requiring APR disclosure. 111 Because the justification for charging 
higher interest rates on subprime home mortgage loans is that the 
borrower has a higher risk of default, disclosure of a borrower's 
credit score-which helps establish the borrower's risk level-would 
have helped to explain differences in subprime lending patterns 
based on race. The Fed declined to require lenders to report credit 
scores because it found that the burden on lenders of producing the 
information would outweigh any additional benefit the credit score 
would provide. 112 
B. Other Changes 
The Fed made several other significant amendments to 
HMDA in 2002. First, the Fed once again increased the number of 
non-depository home mortgage lenders subject to HMDA by adding 
a third alternative test to the $10 million total assets test and the 100-
home mortgage loan test. The Fed required non-depository lenders 
110 See Patterns of Lending, supra note 86, at 215 n.30. 
111 Home Mortgage Disclosure, 65 Fed. Reg. 78,656, 78,661 (proposed Dec. 
15, 2000). 
112 Id. at 78,657 ("The Board believes that, taken as a whole, the proposed 
changes to Regulation C strike an appropriate balance between benefit and 
burden."). 
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that made at least $25 million in loans to report data under HMDA. 113 
The Fed stated that one of the purposes for this change was to cover 
more non-depository mortgage lenders because they were 
"particularly active in the subprime market." 114 
In another change related to subprime lending, the Fed 
required lenders to disclose whether a home mortgage loan was cov-
ered by the Homeownership Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA"). 115 A 
loan is covered by the HOEP A if the interest rate on a first lien home 
mortgage loan is more than eight percentage points higher than the 
yield on Treasury Bills of comparable maturity and ten points higher 
for second lien loans. 116 
The Fed made several additional changes to HMDA to make 
it more useful in identifying discrimination in the home mortgage 
market. First, the Fed required lenders to disclose whether a 
particular home mortgage loan application or origination was for a 
manufactured home. 117 The Fed made this change because 
applications for loans to purchase manufactured homes have higher 
denial rates than loans for traditional homes. 118 Loans to purchase 
manufactured homes are underwritten differently, and thus reporting 
whether an application or loan was for a manufactured home would 
improve the usefulness of HMDA data for understanding the home 
mortgage loan market and for detecting lending discrimination. 119 
The Fed also required lenders to disclose denials of requests 
for preapproval of a loan application and whether an application that 
was originated was initiated as a request for preapproval. 120 
According to the Fed, "preapproval data will allow comparisons of 
minority and non-minority populations that will serve as useful 
113 Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 7222, 7225, 7237 (Feb. 15, 
2002) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(e)(2)(i)(B)). 
114 Home Mortgage Disclosure, 65 Fed. Reg. at 78,657. 
115 Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 7229-30, 7237 (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(l3)). 
116 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, HMDA 2004: 
Revisions to Regulation C-A Training Presentation, http://www.ffiec.gov/ 
hmda/pdf/hmdatraining2003.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). 
117 Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 7227 (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(5), app. A~ l.A.4). 
11s Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 7223-24, 7237 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(4)). 
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screening devices to help identify underwriting processes and 
practices that may warrant scrutiny."121 
Additionally, the Fed required lenders covered by HMDA to 
inquire about the race, ethnicity and gender of individuals who 
applied for loans by telephone. 122 The Fed made this change in an 
effort to increase the percentage of loans for which the race, ethnicity 
and gender of individuals was reported; the percentage of 
applications for which this data was not reported had increased from 
8% in 1993 to 28% in 2000. 123 The Fed suspected that one of the 
reasons for this was an increase in the percentage of applications 
taken by phone. 124 The Fed stated that requiring lenders to inquire 
about ethnicity, race and gender in phone applications will "serve the 
fair lending enforcement purpose of HMDA by improving the data 
obtained on ethnicity, race, and sex; the [Fed] believes this benefit 
outweighs the costs of compliance."125 
Finally, in a move designed to help understand subprime 
lending and potential lending discrimination, the Fed required 
lenders to report whether a home mortgage loan was a first or 
subordinate lien. 126 The Fed instituted this requirement to help 
interpret the new pricing data and to better understand differences in 
denial rates. 127 The Fed stated that interest rates and denial rates 
varied based on whether a loan was a first lien or a second lien and 
that knowing the lien status of a loan was an important part of 
understanding pricing and denial rate data. 128 
C. Current HMDA Reporting Requirements 
The current HMDA coverage and reporting requirements are 
significantly different from what they were in 1975. Before 
examining the data released after the 2002 amendments, it is helpful 
to summarize HMDA's current reporting requirements. This section 
is divided into two parts: 1) the rules relating to the lenders that 
121 Id. at 7224. 
122 Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 43,218, 43,221, 43,223 (June 
27, 2002) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 203, app. A if l.D.2.). 
123 Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 7228. 
124 Id. 
125 Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 43,221. 
126 Id. at 43,220-21 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(14)). 
127 Id at 43 221 
12s Id ' . 
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HMDA now covers and 2) the rules relating to the data that covered 
lenders are required to disclose. 
1. Covered Lenders 
HMDA rules regarding the lenders that must report loans are 
divided into two parts. The first part applies to banks, savings 
associations and credit unions ("depository institutions") and the 
second part applies to other for-profit home mortgage lenders ("non-
depository institutions"). 129 A depository institution must report data 
if during the preceding calendar year it: 1) had assets above an 
annually adjusted inflation-based threshold; 130 2) had a home or 
branch office in an MSA; 131 and 3) either a) was federally insured or 
regulated; 132 or b) originated one home purchase or home refinance 
loan secured by a first lien on a one-to-four family home that was: 133 
1) federally insured, guaranteed or supplemented;134 or 2) intended 
for sale to Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") or 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"). 135 A 
non-depository institution must report data if during the previous 
calendar year it: 136 1) originated home purchase loans that equaled at 
least a) ten% of its dollar volume of loan originations 137 or b) $25 
million; 138 2) had a home or branch office in an MSA; 139 and 3) either 
a) had total assets of more than $I 0 million, including the assets of 
any parent corporation; 140 or b) originated at least 1 00 home purchase 
loans. 141 
129 12 U.S.C. §§ 2802(2), (4), 2808(b) (2006); 12 C.F.R. §§ 203.2(e)(l), 
( e )(2) (2008). 
130 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(e)(l)(i) (2008). In 2009, the asset threshold was $39 
million. 73 Fed. Reg. 78,616 (Dec. 23, 2008). 
131 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(e)(l)(ii) (2008). 
132 Id. at§ 203.2(e)(l)(iv)(A). 
133 Id. at§ 203.2(e)(l)(iii). 
134 Id. at§ 203.2(e)(l)(iv)(B). 
135 Id. at§ 203.2(e)(l)(iv)(c). 
136 Id. at§ 203.2(e)(2)(i). 
137 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(e)(2)(i)(A) (2008). 
138 Id. at§ 203.2(e)(2)(i)(B). 
139 Id. at § 203 .2( e )(2)(ii). 
140 Id. at § 203 .2( e )(iii)( A). 
141 Id. at§ 203.2(e)(iii)(B). 
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2. Disclosure Requirements 
HMDA requires covered lenders to disclose the total number 
and dollar amount of their home purchase, 142 home refinance143 and 
h . 144 1 1· . 145 • • • d ome improvement oan app 1cat1ons, ongmat1ons an pur-
chases each year. 146 For each application or origination, the lender 
must report several items of information, including the 1) type of 
application or loan; 147 2) purpose of the application or loan;148 3) type 
of property; 149 4) owner-occupancy status of the property; 150 5) action 
taken; 151 6) property location; 152 7) borrower income; 153 8) borrower 
142 A home purchase loan is "a loan secured by and made for the purpose of 
purchasing a dwelling." 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(h) (2008). 
143 A home refinance loan is "a new obligation that satisfies and replaces an 
existing obligation by the same borrower," in which "the existing obligation 
is a home purchase loan" and both obligations "are secured by first liens on 
dwellings." Id. at§ 203.2(k)(l). 
144 A home improvement loan is "a loan secured by a lien on a dwelling" to 
be used, at least in part, to repair, rehabilitate, remodel or improve a 
dwelling or the real property on which it is located, or a loan not secured by 
a dwelling that is for the same purpose and classified by the lender as a 
home improvement loan. Id. at§ 203.2(g). 
145 An application is "an oral or written request for" a home mortgage loan 
"that is made in accordance with procedures used by a financial institution 
for the type of credit requested." Id. at§ 203.2(b)(l). 
146 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(l) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a) (2008). 
147 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(2) (2008). Loan or application types include: 1) 
applications insured by the Federal Housing Administration; 2) applications 
guaranteed by the Veterans Administration, Farm Services Agency or Rural 
Housing Service; and 3) conventional applications. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(l) 
(2006); 12 C.F.R. pt. 203, app. A, § I.A.3 (2008). 
148 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(3) (2008). Purposes include: 1) home purchase; 2) 
home improvement; and 3) home refinance. Id. at pt. 203, app. A § I.A.5. 
149 Id. at§ 203.4(a)(5); id. at pt. 203, app. A, § I.A.4. Property types include: 
1) 1-4 family dwellings; 2) manufactured housing; and 3) multi-family 
dwellings. 
150 Id. at§ 203.4(a)(6). 
151 Id. at §§ 203.4(a)(4), (8). Actions include: 1) loan originated, including 
whether the loan began as a preapproval request; 2) application approved by 
the bank but loan not accepted by the applicant; 3) application denied; 4) 
preapproval request denied; 5) application withdrawn; and 6) application 
file closed because incomplete. Id. at pt. 203, app. A,§ I..B.l. A request for 
a preapproval must be reported if the financial institution analyzed the 
creditworthiness of the applicant and issued a written commitment to the 
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race; 154 9) borrower ethnicity; 155 10) borrower gender; 156 11) 
difference between the loan's interest rate and the yield on Treasury 
securities of comparable terms of maturity if the difference is three 
points or more for loans secured by a first lien or five points or more 
applicant valid for a specific period of time to extend a home purchase loan 
up to a particular amount. 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(2). 
152 12 U.S.C. §§ 2803(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (b)(4); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(9). A 
lender must report property location by: 1) Metropolitan Statistical Area 
("MSA") or Metropolitan Division ("MD"); 2) state; 3) county; and 4) 
census tract if the loan is in a county with a population of 30,000 or more. 
Id. at pt. 203, app. A, § I.C.1.-4. An MSA is a geographical area that has at 
least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more people and includes any adjacent 
area that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the 
urbanized area as measured by commuting patterns. Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Glossary, 
http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/glossary.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 
2009). An MSA with a population of 2.5 million or more may be 
subdivided to form smaller groupings of counties called Metropolitan 
Divisions. Id. 
153 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(l0) (2008); 12 
C.F.R. pt. 203, app. A, § I.D.6 (2006). 
154 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(10); 12 C.F.R. pt. 203, app. 
A, § l.D.4. The racial categories are: I) "American Indian or Alaska 
Native," meaning a "person having origins in any of the original peoples of 
North or South America (including Central America) and who maintains 
tribal affiliation or community attachment;" 2) "Asian," meaning a "person 
having origins in any of the peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the 
Indian subcontinent;" 3) "Black or African American," meaning a "person 
having origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa;" 4) "Native 
Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander," meaning a "person having origins in 
any of the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, or other Pacific 
Islands;" and 5) "White," meaning "a person having origins in any of the 
original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa." Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council, supra note I 16, at 6-7. 
155 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(10); id. at pt 203, app A, § I.D.3. Ethnic groups 
include "Hispanic or Latino" and "not Hispanic or Latino." Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council, supra note 116, at 7. Hispanic 
or Latino includes a "person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or 
Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race." Id. 
156 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(l0); id. at pt. 203, app. A,§ 
I.D.5. 
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for loans secured by a subordinate lien; 157 12) whether the loan is 
subject to the HOEPA; 158 and 13) lien status of the loan. 
D. Subprime Lending Data and Its Impact 
In late 2005, the Fed released a study based on data lenders 
reported pursuant to the 2002 amendments. 159 The study showed that 
in 2004, African-Americans, Latinos and residents of predominantly 
minority neighborhoods were more likely than whites or residents of 
predominantly white neighborhoods to receive "subprime" home 
mortgage loans. 160 The report showed that the incidence of subprime 
conventional first-lien home purchase loans was 32.4% for African-
Americans, 20.3% for Latinos and 8.7% for whites. 161 The Fed 
concluded that some of the difference in the subprime lending rates 
could be explained by differences in creditworthiness and other 
factors, but even after taking these factors into account, there were 
unexplained differences. 162 The Fed did not conclude that these 
differences were based on race, but did not eliminate this possibility 
either. 163 The Fed's report confirmed earlier studies, based on less 
precise data, that showed that a higher percentage of the home 
mortgage loans that African-Americans, Latinos and residents of 
predominantly minority neighborhoods received were subprime as 
compared with whites. 164 Additionally, several studies by researchers 
and community groups and other advocates confirmed the Fed's 
finding at the local level. 165 For example, in 2005 in New York City, 
157 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(12). 
158 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(l3). A loan is covered by HOEPA if the interest 
rate exceeds the yield on Treasury securities of comparable periods of 
maturity by eight points for first liens and ten points for second liens or the 
points and fees exceed greater of eight percent of the loan amount or an 
annually adjusted dollar threshold. Federal Financial Institutions Examina-
tion Council, supra note 116, at 9. 
159 Avery & Canner, supra note 105. 
160 Id. at 379. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. After taking these factors into account, the incidence of subprime 
loans decreased to 15.7% for African-Americans and 11.6% for whites. 
163 Id. at 379-80. 
164 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
165 WILLIAM C. APGAR, JR. & CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, U.S. DEP'T OF 
Hous. & URBAN DEV., SUBPRIME LENDING AND ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL 
SERVICE PROVIDERS: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS viii 
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45.9% of all home mortgage loans to African-Americans were 
subprime, and 39% of all home mortgage loans to Latinos were 
subprime. 166 African-Americans were nearly three times more likely 
than whites to receive a subprime loan; Latinos were more than twice 
as likely. 167 Of all of the home loans in predominantly minority 
neighborhoods, 42.1 % were subprime, nearly four times higher than 
in predominantly white neighborhoods. 168 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the firestorm that the disclosure 
of HMDA data pursuant to the 1989 amendments caused, the 
(2006); DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE 
PRICE OF SUBPRTME MORTGAGES 3 (2006); CALIFORNIA REINVESTMENT 
COALITION, ET AL., PAYING MORE FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM: A MULTT-
ST A TE ANALYSTS OF HIGHER COST HOME PURCHASE LENDING I (2007); JIM 
CAMPEN, BORROWING TROUBLE VII: HIGHER-COST MORTGAGE LENDING 
TN BOSTON, GREATER BOSTON AND MASSACHUSETTS, 2005 6 (2007); JIM 
CAMPEN, BORROWING TROUBLE? VI: HIGHER-COST MORTGAGE LENDING 
IN GREATER BOSTON, 2004 4 (2006); RICHARD MARSICO, THE ECON. 
JUSTICE PROJECT OF THE JUSTICE ACTION CTR. N.Y. LAW SCH., THE 
HIGHER COST OF BEING AFRICAN-AMERICAN OR LATINO: SUBPRIME HOME 
MORTGAGE LENDING IN NEW YORK CITY, 2004-2005 3 (2007); NATIONAL 
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, FAIR LENDING DISPARITIES BY 
RACE, INCOME, AND GENDER IN ALL METROPOLITAN AREAS IN AMERICA 3 
(2005); NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, THE CRA AND 
FAIR LENDING PERFORMANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TN THE CITY OF 
PHILADELPHIA 4 (2006); NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 
COALITION, ET AL., HOMEOWNERSHIP AND WEAL TH BUILDING IMPEDED I 
(2006); NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, INCOME TS No 
SHIELD AGAINST RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN LENDING: A COMPARISON OF 
HIGH-COST LENDING IN AMERICA'S METROPOLITAN AREAS 5 (2007); 
NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, PREAPPROVALS AND 
PRICING DISPARITIES IN THE MORTGAGE MARKETPLACE: A NCRC 
FOLLOW-UP REPORT FOR NATIONAL HOMEOWNERSHIP MONTH 5 (2005); 
NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, THE 2004 FAIR 
LENDING DISPARITIES: STUBBORN AND PERSISTENT 5-6 (2005); NATIONAL 
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, THE 2005 FAIR LENDING 
DISPARITIES: STUBBORN AND PERSISTENT II 7 (2006); WOODSTOCK 
INSTITUTE, NEW MORTGAGE PRICING DATA SHEDS LIGHT ON SUBPRTME 
MARKET 2 (2005); NCRC Fair Lending Testing Reveals Discrimination by 
Mortgage Brokers, NCRC REINVESTMENT WORKS I (National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition), Summer, 2006, at 4. 
166 See MARSICO, supra note 164, at 3-4. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 4. 
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disclosure of the data under the 2002 amendments, while controver-
sial, did not have the same impact. Although community advocates 
published numerous studies showing these disparities, 169 headlines 
across the nation did not materialize. Despite some noteworthy 
exceptions, government investigation and enforcement efforts have 
been sluggish. Highlights include former New York State Attorney 
General Elliot Spitzer's investigation of subprime lending disparities 
using 2004 HMDA data. He subsequently brought and settled a claim 
against Countrywide in 2006.170 Between January 1, 2004 and June 
30, 2007, the four federal banking regulatory agencies referred 134 
potential discrimination cases to the Department of Justice. 171 
However, the Department has not filed any cases. 
Private enforcement efforts were also slow to develop, but 
recently the efforts have increased. For example, the National Com-
munity Reinvestment Coalition filed an administrative complaint 
with HUD alleging that Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corporation 
often steered minority "mystery shoppers" to subprime loans even 
though they were qualified for prime loans, while Allied referred 
white comparison "mystery shoppers" to prime loans. 172 In July 
2007, the NAACP filed a class-action lawsuit against eleven 
mortgage lenders, alleging that African-Americans received higher 
percentages of subprime loans than whites. 173 
V. Looking Ahead: The Role of HMDA in Detecting and 
Deterring Risky, Unsafe, and Predatory Lending 
Although many factors contributed to the economic crisis of 
2008, one common denominator is the high loan default rate on 
risky, unsafe, and abusive loans. There were several efforts to 
regulate such lending prior to the crisis, most notably through laws 
requmng disclosure of loan terms. These efforts, however, were 
generally not successful in either protecting the victims of such 
169 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
17
° Kate Berry, Countrywide Spitzer Deal A Disclosure Precedent?, 171 
AM. BANKER 1, 1 (Dec. 6, 2006). 
171 Cheyenne Hopkins, HMDA Suits Backdrop.for Committee Hearings, 172 
AM. BANKER I, 3 (July 25, 2007). 
172 Complaint at 5, National Community Reinvestment Coalition v. Allied 
Home Mortgage Capital Corporation, (U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urb. Dev. 
filed June 14, 2006). 
173 Hopkins, supra note 170, at 1. 
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lending practices or preventing the economic collapse. The onset of 
the economic crisis has given rise to proposals to reform regulation 
of the financial services industry, including a proposal to amend 
HMDA by expanding the disclosures it requires. This amendment 
would require lenders to disclose a significant amount of information 
about risky, unsafe, and abusive lending that harms borrowers and 
contributed to the economic crisis. However, the proposed amend-
ment does not quite require sufficient information to deter and detect 
the full range of harmful and risky lending practices. In particular, 
the amendment does not require lenders to disclose enough informa-
tion about whether a loan is suitable for a borrower. Without 
requiring sufficient disclosure, the proposed amendment runs the risk 
of previous insufficient HMDA amendments-failing to persuade 
government decision makers that the underlying problem exists. 
A. The Role of Risky, Unsafe and Abusive Lending 
in the Current Economic Crisis 
The causes of the economic collapse of 2008 are complex 
and will likely not be fully understood for years. Yet by now, the 
story of the collapse has been told numerous times and it has become 
sadly familiar: the sharp fall in housing prices in 2006 was followed 
by the "subprime meltdown" in 2007, characterized by high rates of 
defaults and foreclosure on homes secured by subprime loans. 174 This 
meltdown resulted in the collapse of several financial institutions in 
2008 and the bare survival of others, followed by the freezing of the 
credit markets, widespread layoffs, and displacement in all areas of 
the American economy .175 Also well-documented are the wrenching 
human consequences of millions as people have lost their homes and 
jobs, and nearly all have lost their sense of well-being and security. 
174 Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
and the Social Capital Response, 60 S.C. L. REV. 271, 295 (2009). 
175 See, e.g., Id. at 295-96; Gerald Komgold, Legal and Policy Choices in 
the Aftermath of the Subprime and Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. 
REV. 549, 728-33 (2009); Allan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown: How Did it Happen and How Will it End?, 13 J. STRUCTURED 
FIN. 13, 14-16 (2007); Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime 
Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 549-53 (2009). For a general over-
view of the securitization process, see Amy L. Festante, Securitization 's 
Role in the Collapse of the Subprime Mortgage Market (Justice Action 
Center Student Capstone Journal, Project No. 07/08-028, 2008). 
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Many are implicated in the collapse, from borrowers who 
could not afford to repay their loans, to mortgage brokers who made 
loans they knew were unaffordable, to lenders who provided the 
funds for the loans they knew were unsafe, to investment bankers 
who pressured lenders to reduce credit standards and purchased and 
packaged the loans for sale as securities to the secondary market 
without proper scrutiny, to rating agencies that overrated the 
securities, and to investors who were hungry for high returns. In the 
aftermath of the collapse, there has been much finger pointing among 
and at them. 176 
Regardless of the ultimate causes and who the responsible 
parties are, the use of risky, unsafe, and abusive loans177 are part of 
the picture, if not the ultimate cause, of the collapse. These loans 
were too risky to withstand economic displacement and once the 
displacement occurred, defaults on these loans certainly helped spark 
the causal chain that led to the current crisis. 178 These risky, unsafe, 
176 See Brescia, supra note 174, at 291-300; Korngold, supra note 174, at 
728-33; Ruth S. Uselton, Exotic Loan Products & the Collapse of the 
Subprime Mortgage Market 12-13 (Justice Action Center Student Capstone 
Journal, Project No. 07/08-02A, 2008). 
177 These three terms for characterizing loans that are not part of the prime 
market, although often interchangeable when applied to a particular loan, 
are meant to capture three different ways of looking at non-prime loans. 
"Risky" loans include loans that carry more than the normal amount of risk, 
such as a loan that does not document the borrower's income or assets. 
"Unsafe" loans include loans that the borrower does not have a realistic 
chance of repaying, including a loan whose monthly interest payments are 
too high a percentage of the borrower's monthly income. See Baher Azmy, 
Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories 
of Experimentation, 57 U. FLA. L. REV. 295, 355 (2005) (stating that 
"certain practices are inherently dangerous when connected with very high-
cost loans .... ")."Abusive" loans are based on misrepresentation, fraud, or 
exploitation. For examples of abusive lending practices, see id. at 333; 
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law 
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1267-68 
(2002); Celeste M. Hammond, Predatory Lending-A Legal Definition and 
Update, 34 REAL EST. L. J. 176, 180 (2005). A non-prime loan may contain 
a combination of aspects of all three of these characteristics or just one. An 
effective HMDA disclosure regime would capture as many of the 
characteristics of risky, unsafe, and abusive loans as possible. 
178 See Krinsman, supra note 175, at 14 ("Once the housing market slowed, 
the credit risk of the subprime mortgage market could no longer be masked 
by surging home prices."). 
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and abusive loans are often characterized by the terms "subprime" or 
"predatory" loans. Subprime loans, as described earlier, are loans that 
charge higher interest rates and fees to reflect higher borrower risk 
factors. 179 While there is no standard definition of predatory 
lending, 180 loans with certain characteristics are generally deemed 
predatory. Predatory loans occur when the terms provide no benefit 
to the borrower and are simply an excuse for extracting profit, the 
borrower has no real chance of repaying the loan, the terms are 
confusing or misleading, the terms are not related to the borrower's 
level of risk, the borrower's risk is not properly assessed, or the loan 
was made based on fraud or misrepresentation of the terms. 181 A non-
exhaustive list of these predatory loan characteristics includes 
I . I 82 b 11 183 • • prepayment pena ties, a oon payments, negative amortiza-
tion, 184 asset-based loans, 185 high housing debt/income and overall 
179 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
180 See Hammond, supra note 177, at 178. 
181 Cf Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at 1260, stating that predatory 
lending is: 
[A] syndrome of abusive loan terms or practices that 
involve one or more of the following five problems: 
1) loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate 
net harm to borrowers; 2) harmful rent seeking; 3) loans 
involving fraud or deceptive practices; 4) other forms of 
lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable as 
fraud; and 5) loans that require borrowers to waive 
meaningful legal redress. 
182 A prepayment penalty is a penalty for repaying a loan before it is due. 
See Azmy, supra note 177, at 338; Uselton, supra note 176, at 9. 
183 A balloon payment is a payment due at a certain point in the life of the 
loan that could represent the outstanding balance of the loan or another 
amount that is much higher than the minimum monthly payment. See Azmy, 
supra note 177, at 340; Uselton, supra note 176, at 9-10. 
184 A negatively amortizing loan is a loan whose monthly interest payments 
are not high enough to pay the monthly balance due, resulting in an 
increased loan balance (negatively amortizing) rather than a decreased loan 
balance. See Azmy, supra note 177, at 340-41; Engel & McCoy, supra note 
177, at 1263-64. 
185 An asset-based loan is a loan that is based on the value of the collateral 
for the loan rather than the borrower's ability to repay the loan. See Azmy, 
supra note 177, at 337; Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at 1262. 
2009-2010 HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT TURNS THIRTY-FIVE 243 
debt/income ratios, 186 excessively high fees, interest rates, and 
points, 187 high loan-to-value ratios, 188 confusing adjustable rate 
periods, 189 and little or no documentation of the borrower's income, 
employment, source of funds, or assets. 190 
B. Past Efforts to Regulate Risky, Unsafe and 
Abusive Lending 
Since the onset of the economic collapse, there have been 
many proposals to deal with this crisis and prevent another one. 191 
Enhanced regulation of the financial services industry is one idea, 
and the Obama administration has introduced legislation that would 
overhaul the regulation of the industry. 192 Even prior to the economic 
collapse, however, risky, unsafe, and abusive lending was the subject 
186 These ratios, which measure the borrower's monthly housing debt and 
overall debt payments against the borrower's monthly income, are often 
used as measures of the borrower's ability to repay a loan. 
187 Lenders charge fees for things like their attorneys, the property appraisal 
and a credit check. Points are fees charged as percentage "points" of the 
overall loan, often shared by a mortgage broker if one is involved in the 
loan. 
188 The loan-to-value ratio compares the amount of the loan to the value of 
the property that is the collateral for the loan. Generally, the higher the ratio, 
the riskier the loan. 
189 Adjustable rate mortgages establish an initial interest rate that adjusts to 
a different level, often based on an index, after a certain time period. See 
Krinsman, supra note 175, at 15; Uselton, supra note 176, at 3-4. 
19
° Compare this list of characteristics with Hammond, supra note 177, at 
180, listing prepayment penalties, balloon payments, high interest rates, 
negative amortization, high appraisal costs, up front credit insurance, 
mandatory pre-dispute resolution clauses and prohibited "kickbacks" to 
brokers in the guise of yield spread premiums as characteristic terms of 
predatory loans. See also CALIFORNIA REINVESTMENT COALITION, ET AL., 
PAYING MORE FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM Ill: PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING TO LOWER-INCOME COMMUNITIES AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR ii 
(2009) (listing adjustable rates, negative amortization, interest-only loan 
payments, prepayment penalties, yield spread premiums and no-income 
documentation as loan terms associated with risky loans). 
191 See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 174, at 304-11 (suggesting mortgage broker 
accountability, community-based pre-loan counseling, and specialized 
foreclosure courts). 
192 Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 11 lth 
Cong. (2009). 
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oflegislation and many other reform proposals because of the harm it 
caused to borrowers. 193 Congress passed or amended legislation such 
as the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA")194 and the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act ("RESP A"), 195 with the intention of 
curbing predatory lending by requiring lenders to disclose the costs 
and terms of loans to borrowers. Congress also passed HOEPA, 196 
which banned certain terms on specific types of home mortgage 
loans whose interest rates passed a certain threshold or whose points 
and fees were higher than a fixed percentage of the loan amount or a 
specific dollar amount. 197 Several states attempted to regulate 
predatory lending as well, although federal legislation preempted 
many of their efforts. 198 
Among the previously passed legislation, TILA and RESP A 
have frequently been considered unsuccessful 199 or even harmfuI.200 
HOEP A's attempt to curb abusive lending practices directly has 
received similar criticism.201 Comprehensive laws regulating 
193 See, e.g., Azmy, supra note 177, at 84; Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, 
at 1305. 
194 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2006). 
195 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U .S.C. §§ 1831 b, 
2601-17 (2006). 
196 Homeownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, 15 U .S.C. §§ 1639, 
1648 (2006). 
197 See Azmy, supra note 177, at 352-55. Prohibited terms and practices 
include negative amortization and in certain instances balloon payments, 
prepayment penalties and asset-based lending. 
198 See id. at 361-90; Hammond, supra note 177, at 189-203. 
199 See Azmy, supra note 177, at 351-52 (arguing that disclosure of loan 
terms has not worked because there is little price competition in the 
predatory lending market, predatory loans are usually so complex that 
comparing loan products is virtually impossible and disclosures come too 
late in the process to make a difference); Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, 
at 1306-09 (arguing that TILA has not worked because it exempts too many 
fees from disclosure and RESPA has not worked because it has resulted in 
lengthy and confusing disclosure statements). 
200 See Azmy, supra note 177, at 352 (arguing that the lending industry 
recognizes the legal and political advantages of complying with disclosure 
rules, including allowing them to mask the complexity of the underlying 
loans, defending against allegations of oral misrepresentations, and 
providing political cover against charges that their loans are too expensive 
or abusive and are a shield against calls for more regulation of loan terms). 
201 See id. at 355-57 (arguing that HOEPA's points and fees triggers are too 
high causing very few loans fall under its coverage, that the triggers are high 
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predatory lending have not been passed, perhaps because they tend to 
contradict market-based solutions to risky, unsafe and abusive 
lending.202 Efforts to impose direct curbs on abusive lending 
practices are opposed by arguments that the government should not 
interfere with individual credit transactions, that regulation would 
limit the amount of available credit, that people should take 
individual responsibility for their financial decisions and that the 
market will self-correct.203 
One proposal to regulate the terms of predatory lending that 
merit continuing attention-and that differs from the TILA's and the 
RESPA's disclosure rules and the HOEPA's limited efforts to 
regulate loan terms-is imposing a "suitability" requirement on 
home mortgage loans.204 Based on similar requirements for investors 
in the securities industry, a suitability requirement for home 
mortgage loans would establish criteria for determining whether a 
loan is suitable for the borrower. One suitability proposal would 
prohibit lenders from making a loan that was not consistent with the 
borrower's financial circumstances, needs and objectives.205 Another 
enough to allow room for abuse and exploitation in loans that do not trigger 
HOEP A coverage and that lenders have discovered loopholes to avoid 
falling within HOEPA's coverage); Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at 
1307-08, 1349 (arguing that HOEPA is easy to evade because of its narrow 
coverage and high interest and fee triggers and that to avoid these triggers, 
lenders create complex pricing mechanisms that make non-prime loans 
more complex than they otherwise might have been). 
202 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at 1299 ("From the standpoint of 
neoclassical economics, market solutions are the preferred answer to 
predatory lending."). 
203 Id. at 1334, 1358-60. For a discussion of the difficulties of balancing 
regulation with individual freedom and the risks of mistakes see Komgold, 
supra note 174, at 733 (noting the difficulty in striking the proper balance 
between "personal responsibility and paternalism in ... setting the ground 
rules for the overall system"). 
204 See Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If the Loan Doesn't Fit, Don't Take It: 
Applying the Suitability Doctrine to the Mortgage Industry to Eliminate 
Predatory Lending, 10 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEV. 117, 125-27 
(2001); Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at 1317-66. 
205 Ehrenberg, supra note 204, at 125. To make this determination, lenders 
would be expected to inquire into several factors, including the borrower's 
age, occupation, estimated income, employment status, assets and net worth, 
marital status, number of dependents, credit references and history, ability 
to repay the loan, other debts, and the condition and appraised value of the 
collateral and the amount of the owner's equity in the collateral. Id. at 126. 
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proposal suggests several standards for suitability, including 
prohibiting lenders from making loans that borrowers cannot reason-
ably be expected to repay and basing loan fees, charges and points on 
legitimate pricing functions. 206 Suitability would thus go beyond 
disclosure of loan terms to ensure that loans are not overly risky, 
unsafe or abusive. A suitability requirement could both protect the 
borrower from the consequences of taking such a loan and protect the 
economy as a whole from collapse if overall economic conditions 
result in dangerously high levels of default on risky and unsafe 
loans. 207 Despite the merits of the suitability proposal, Congress has 
not passed legislation imposing it, perhaps because of the power of 
the market-based arguments that underlie the current disclosure 
. 208 
regime. 
C. The Role of HMDA in Regulating Risky, Unsafe 
and Abusive Lending 
In the context of the current economic crisis, efforts to avert 
the next one and previous efforts and proposals to regulate risky, 
unsafe and abusive lending, the question is whether the sort of public 
disclosure of lending reflected in HMDA can play a meaningful role. 
HMDA's history has shown that when compelling data about lending 
practices are disclosed to the public, real change can occur. The 
converse is also true. Insufficient data has resulted in limited change. 
So the question for any proposals to amend HMDA is whether the 
proposal incorporates this lesson from HMDA's history and contains 
sufficient information to detect and deter risky, unsafe and abusive 
lending and the lenders that engage in it. 
The proposed CFP AA, 209 among several provisions that 
would overhaul the regulation of the financial services industry, 
proposes several changes to HMDA that would help it detect risky, 
unsafe and abusive lending by requiring several additional 
206 Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at 1343. 
207 But see Schwarcz, supra note 175, at 566 (suggesting that inlposing 
suitability requirements on mortgage loans and otherwise restricting 
predatory lending may have restricted externalities but would "almost 
certainly not address the next crisis"). 
208 SeeEngel&McCoy,supranote 177,at 1334, 1358, 1360. 
209 Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, I I Ith 
Cong. (2009). 
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disclosures.210 The first group of proposed disclosures would require 
a lender to disclose the total number and dollar value of home 
mortgage loans grouped according to: 1) the total points and fees 
payable at origination; 2) the difference between the APR associated 
with the loan and a benchmark APR for all loans; and 3) the term in 
months of any prepayment penalty. The second group of disclosures 
requires the lender to disclose the total number and dollar volume of 
home mortgage loans and the total number of completed applications 
for loans grouped according to the following characteristics: 1) the 
age of the applicant or borrower; 2) the value of the collateral; 3) the 
term in months of any introductory period after which the rate of 
interest may change; 4) the presence of mortgage terms that would 
allow the borrower or applicant to make payments other than fully-
amortizing payments during any portion of the loan term; 5) the term 
in months of the mortgage loan; 6) the channel through which the 
application was made, including retail and broker; and 7) the credit 
score of mortgage applicant or borrower. 
These proposed amendments would improve HMDA's 
ability to accomplish its current tripartite mission of detecting and 
counteracting redlining, lending discrimination and reverse redlining. 
In particular, requiring disclosure of a loan's total points and fees and 
the difference between the loan's APR and a benchmark APR would 
help detect and deter lending discrimination. Likewise, the disclosure 
of the applicant's and borrower's credit score would help to identify 
discrimination and reverse redlining.211 The amendments, if passed, 
would also mark the beginning of another significant era in HMDA's 
history by adding another task to its mission: detecting and deterring 
risky, unsafe and abusive lending. The goal would be to help prevent 
another economic collapse fueled by risky and unsafe lending and 
also to help prevent several of the predatory lending practices that 
harm individual borrowers.212 
In combination with the information HMDA currently 
requires lenders to disclose, the proposed HMDA amendments would 
identify many of the risky, unsafe and abusive lending practices that 
were at the heart of the economic crisis. The disclosures were 
210 H.R. 3126 §§ 1086(g)(I), (4). 
211 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. 
212 See CALIFORNIA REINVESTMENT COALITION, ET AL., supra note 190, at ii 
("Improving HMDA data disclosure to include risky loan features ... will 
improve the quality of lending in low- and moderate-income communities 
and communities of color."). 
248 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 29 
proposed as intentionally broad in an attempt to identify past and 
existing undesirable practices and new and unanticipated practices as 
well.213 
There are several examples of the impact these disclosures 
would have. First, adjustable rate loans with prepayment penalties 
have been identified as having contributed to the economic crisis.214 
Borrowers who took a loan at an affordable rate that would become 
unaffordable once the rate adjusted with the promise that they could 
refinance were unable to do so when the rate adjusted once housing 
prices dropped and the value of their collateral decreased. 215 The 
proposed HMDA amendments would likely capture many of these 
loans by requiring disclosure of the APR, prepayment penalty terms 
and interest rate adjustment periods. Second, by requiring disclosure 
of points, fees, APR and the borrower's credit score, the amendments 
would help evaluate whether the interest rate is tied to the borrower's 
risk level, and thus possibly excessive. Excessive fees and rates are 
not only arguably harmful to the borrower, but in times of crisis 
make it more difficult to repay. And if, as demonstrated by the 
requirement that the lender's APR be compared with a benchmark, 
the lender's APR is higher than the aggregate, this can be an 
indication that the lender is engaged in predatory or discriminatory 
practices not justified by overall market conditions. Third, another 
proposed amendment would help detect negatively amortizing loans, 
which by increasing the loan amount relative to the collateral become 
especially risky when housing prices drop. Finally, requiring 
disclosure of the age of the borrower and the channel through which 
the loan was made, combined with the other proposed disclosures, 
would help detect and deter abusive practices aimed at elderly home 
213 See Schwarcz, supra note 175, at 560 ("It is impossible to know how 
future financial crises will arise. Ultimately, the key to protecting against 
future crises is to remain open, flexible, and aware of changing 
circumstances. To this end, the government should take a broad and flexible 
approach."). 
214 See Uselton, supra note 176, at 4-6. 215 See Brescia, supra note 174, at 296; Schwarcz, supra note 175, at 550-
51. 
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mortgage loan applicants and borrowers216 and identify lending 
channels that are more likely to lead to predatory loans.217 
Despite the breadth of these proposals to amend HMDA, the 
added disclosures do not cover many of the other practices identified 
as having contributed to the economic crisis. In addition, they do not 
require sufficient information to determine whether a loan is suitable 
for the borrower. For example, two types of loans-stated income 
loans, in which the borrower's income is not verified, and "low-doc" 
and "no-doc" loans, which require little or no documentation of other 
information relevant to the lending decision-have been associated 
with predatory and risky lending and implicated in the economic 
crisis,218 but the proposed amendments do not require lenders to 
disclose the total number of such loans. 
Another phenomenon associated with unsafe and abusive 
lending is "loan flipping," in which the lender makes several loans in 
a short period of time to the same borrower-each with increasingly 
higher balances and each with higher fees and each less affordable to 
the borrower-resulting in high rates of foreclosure.219 One piece of 
information that would be helpful in detecting loan flipping would be 
the period in months between the borrower's last loan and the current 
one. The proposed amendments also do not require disclosure of 
loans with balloon payments, which could have the same effect as 
adjustable interest rates and prepayment penalties by forcing a 
borrower to refinance at a time of personal or overall economic 
difficulty and increasing the probability of default or foreclosure.220 
Most notably, the proposed HMDA amendments do not 
contain enough information to determine whether a loan is suitable 
for the borrower. In the context of expanding HMDA data to detect 
and deter unsafe and abusive lending that is harmful to borrowers 
and could lead to another economic crisis, "suitability" should be 
defined at the very least to include loans that the borrower has a 
reasonable likelihood of repaying. Many of the proposed disclosures 
216 See, e.g., Azmy, supra note 177, at 334 (identifying the elderly as 
frequent victims of predatory lending). 
217 See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 174, at 295 (citing a study showing that in 
2004, nearly half of all subprime loans went through a broker compared 
with 28% of all prime loans). 
218 See id. at 296; Krinsman, supra note 175, at 15. 
219 See Azmy, supra note 177204, at 335-36; Ehrenberg, supra note 204, at 
181; Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at 1263. 
220 See Uselton, supra note 176, at 9-10. 
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will help determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that a 
loan can be repaid, including the loan's points and fees, APR, 
interest rate adjustment period, prepayment penalty and the value of 
the collateral. However, several other disclosures are necessary, 
including disclosure of low- and no-doc loans and information 
relating to loan flipping. Most importantly, the borrower's housing 
debt/income and overall debt/income ratios should be disclosed, as 
they are crucial in determining whether the borrower can repay a 
loan and whether the loan is suitable. 
The main potential arguments against these proposals to 
expand HMDA's disclosures are that they would cost too much and 
undermine market operations. In addressing the cost of these 
disclosures, several factors should be taken into account. As the 
history of HMDA shows, if the information that HMDA disclosures 
elicit is insufficient to describe or demonstrate the harm the 
disclosures are intended to address, the impact of the disclosure will 
be limited, wasting at least some of the cost of such disclosures. The 
marginal cost of the added disclosures increases the value of the 
entire investment in information disclosure. The cost of the added 
disclosures should also be measured against the potential cost of 
failing to disclose the information. If the marginal cost of the 
additional information can help prevent the risky, unsafe, and 
abusive lending that helped spark the economic crisis-and there is a 
good argument based on HMDA's history that comprehensive 
disclosure does have an impact on lending behavior-then the 
marginal cost of the disclosures could potentially save trillions of 
dollars of evaporated wealth and government spending that have 
accompanied the current crisis. 
Regarding the market-based arguments, reference to the 
legislative history accompanying HMDA's passage is relevant. As 
Senator Proxmire pointed out, HMDA's required disclosures are a 
"gentle remedy" that do not prohibit or penalize anything.221 
Disclosure of complete information about risky, unsafe and abusive 
loan practices does not prohibit any lending, does not impose lending 
terms and does not penalize predatory lending. Instead, as made clear 
in HMDA's original legislative history, disclosure simply provides 
consumers and government officials with facts about lending, facts 
that promote rather than inhibit the market. These facts can, in turn, 
assist community groups in identifying lenders that may be engaging 
in abusive tactics so they can work with them to change their 
221 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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practices,222 alert consumers about lenders to avoid223 and assist 
government officials in making decisions about how to enforce the 
law and whether the level of risk in the home mortgage lending 
market is too high. 
VL Conclusion 
As HMDA enters its thirty-fifth year, looking back at its 
history can help chart its course ahead. HMDA uses the power of 
public disclosure of information about lending to accomplish its 
various goals, including detecting and deterring redlining, lending 
discrimination and reverse redlining. HMDA's overall success is in 
direct proportion to the amount and sufficiency of the information it 
requires lenders to disclose in connection with the practices to be 
eliminated. With the economic crisis of 2008 have come numerous 
proposals to reform regulation of the financial services industry, 
including a proposal to amend HMDA to detect and deter many of 
the risky, unsafe and abusive lending practices that have harmed 
borrowers and helped fuel the crisis. The proposals are helpful but do 
not go quite far enough in requiring sufficient data disclosure. Based 
on HMDA's prior history, Congress would be wise to make HMDA 
as effective a tool as possible in regulating home mortgage lending to 
the benefit of affected borrowers and the economy. 
222 See CALIFORNIA REINVESTMENT COALITION, ET AL., supra note 190, at ii 
("Additionally, expanding data collection would give communities the tools 
to better understand the lending occurring in their neighborhoods."). This 
use ofHMDA is also a part of its original justification. See supra notes 34-
35 and accompanying text. 
223 This theme is also familiar in HMDA's legislative history, which 
suggested that HMDA data would enable communities to detect and deter 
redlining. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 

